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Abstract
We study a model that integrates productive and socializing ef-
forts with occupational choice, in the presence of endogenous spillovers.
Among other results, we show that more talented individuals work
harder and contribute more to the emergence of externalities, but also
have incentives to segregate. Average socializing increases in the average
productivity of the occupation. Also, the size of an occupation grows
in its network synergies. Turning to efficiency, we show that individuals
under-invest in productive and socializing effort, and sort themselves
inefficiently into occupations. We derive the optimal subsidy to reach
the first best sorting into different occupations. Finally, we derive a rule
to identify overpopulated sectors and establish the connection between
inequality of talents, socializing and productive efforts and occupation
size.
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1 Introduction
Many productive processes are mediated by social interactions. The accumu-
lation of human capital (Moretti, 2004), innovation (Cassiman and Veugelers,
2002), and crime (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman, 2003), are examples of
activities carried out by individuals whose actions are affected by the activities
and abilities of others with whom they establish connections. Since social in-
teractions have productive consequences, economic agents naturally devote a
considerable effort to developing them. From the perspective of an individual,
socializing in production activities involves two different but interconnected de-
cisions: first, selecting with whom to interact, and then choosing the strength
of these interactions, together with their productive effort. However, the liter-
ature has explored these two dimensions of socializing separately.1 We develop
a framework to study the joint determination of both dimensions of socializing
in the context of occupational choice. We show how spillovers emerge endoge-
nously from individual productive efforts and socializing decisions, investigate
the associated effects on welfare and derive novel implications for policy and
empirical research.
Formally, we study a model in which individuals are endowed with differ-
ent (occupation-specific) abilities and socializing is multidimensional. First,
each individual decides which occupation to join. Once individuals sort them-
selves into occupations, they choose their productive effort and the intensity of
their social interactions. Socializing allows individuals to benefit from the en-
dogenous spillovers emerging from the productive efforts of those in the same
occupation. Despite the complexity imposed by these features, our framework
allows for a comprehensive equilibrium and welfare analysis in a simple and
intuitive way. Our analysis generates new insights and empirical implications
for occupational choice with great ease. Furthermore, as we briefly discuss in
the Conclusion, our framework is compelling since it is sufficiently flexible to
study many social and economic phenomena.
Embedding endogenous spillovers in a model of occupational choice is
important for several reasons. First, because these spillovers exist: empiri-
1The study of how peers are selected has been conducted from various angles; among
them, neighborhoods (Benabou, 1993), schools (Epple and Romano, 1998; Ferreyra and
Kosenok, 2015), social networks (Goyal, 2012; Jackson, 2010; Vega-Redondo, 2007) and
even specialties within occupations (Arcidiacono and Nicholson, 2005). The issue of within
group socializing has been studied by Cabrales, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2011) and
Canen and Trebbi (2016).
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cally the importance of social connections for entrepreneurs,2 for professionals3
and even for the unemployed4 has been widely established. Second, because
spillovers matter: Guiso and Schivardi (2011) find that spillovers rather than
heterogeneous entry costs are the explanation for differences in entrepreneurial
activities across Italian regions.5 Finally, spillovers are likely to be endogenous:
if spillovers are beneficial (damaging), rational individuals will look for ways
to enhance (reduce) them. The scarce existing literature introducing spillovers
into occupational choice takes them as exogenous.6
Analyzing endogenous spillovers leads to important insights. Our frame-
work allows us to characterize the optimal policy to achieve efficiency in occu-
pational choice. We provide the explicit form of the the first-best allocation for
the social planner which can be achieved in equilibrium combining a linear tax
with a particular subsidy for any type of distribution of talents. This result
shows that the optimal policy needs to have two dimensions to correct both
the within sector inefficiency caused by the externality of spillovers and the
misallocations across occupations. This finding rationalizes why many mea-
sures implemented by governments to correct inefficient occupational choices,
in particular measures to boost entrepreneurship, have failed.7 There are other
examples, where a policy is designed with the purpose of affecting the interac-
tion environment of individuals. As Carrell, Sacerdote, and West (2013) show,
doing this without considering the incentives for interaction, and the fact that
group formation is endogenous can lead to counterproductive effects of the
intervention.
One of the most novel contributions of our analysis is to study the impli-
cations of spillovers for allocations of individuals across sectors. We assume
that individual abilities are given according to a Pareto distribution, since
wages and income, at least at the top of the distribution, are well described
by a Pareto.8 With a Pareto distribution of talents our equilibrium is unique,
2See for example, Guiso and Schivardi (2011); Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2015);
Hoanga and Antoncic (2003).
3See for example West, Barron, Dowsett, and Newton (1999) for the medical and Ogus
(2002) for the legal profession.
4Korpi (2001).
5The approach on heterogeneous entry costs is implicitly followed by a large literature
that focuses on (particularly financial) factors that keep the would-be entrepreneurs from
actually creating a new firm (e.g Quadrini, 2009).
6For example, Guiso and Schivardi (2011); Cicala, Fryer Jr, and Spenkuch (2016); Chan-
dra and Staiger (2007).
7See for example, Henrekson and Stenkula (2010); Acs, A˚stebro, Audretsch, and Robin-
son (2016).
8See Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2015) for a recent reference.
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which is a useful feature of our framework. We find that the type of allocative
inefficiency (overpopulation or underpopulation of one occupation) depends
on the Pareto shape parameter and the strength of the synergies. Our model
provides two rules of thumb to identify potentially over- or underpopulated oc-
cupational sectors. The first rule applies to a situation with a low dispersion in
the Pareto distribution, implying that each sector is characterized by few su-
perstars. In such a situation, the sector with stronger synergies is going to be
underpopulated. On the contrary, when synergies are weak in all occupational
sectors, the sector with stronger synergies is overpopulated. These results are
important because they provide guidance for both policy and empirical work.
We also explore how increasing inequality in talent affects allocative ineffi-
ciency. In our framework, increasing the dispersion of a distribution enhances
socializing and productive efforts. Interestingly, this effect is not confined to
the occupation where inequality increases, but also takes place in the other
occupation. Distributional spillovers across occupations imply that more in-
equality leads to a better selection of types in both occupations inducing higher
productive and socializing intensities, thereby connecting two phenomena that
are generally considered as independent from each other. This is another novel
result with useful implications for policy and empirical analysis.9
We also provide a secondary set of results concerning individual decisions
about productive and socializing effort within a given occupation for general
distributions of talents. We show that more talented individuals do not only
work harder but also generate more spillovers.10 Furthermore, our model pre-
dicts that on average individuals in more productive occupations work harder
and socialize more.11 But average socializing and, hence, learning spillovers
are also increasing in network synergies. As a consequence, occupations with
weaker synergies should experience lower interactions and fewer spillovers.12
Insofar as synergies capture institutional and technological aspects of socializ-
9Inequality spilling over across occupations is a relatively unstudied possibility. In a
recent paper, Clemens, Gottlieb, He´mous, and Olsen (2016) show that higher inequality
in one occupation spills over into other occupations through consumption demand across
occupations, yielding further increases in inequality.
10This result is consistent, for example, with Azoulay, Zivin, and Wang (2010), who show
that researchers collaborating with a superstar scientist experience a significant decline in
their productivity (quality adjusted publication rate) after the unexpected death of their
superstar collaborators. Similarly, Waldinger (2010) find that the expulsion of high quality
Jewish scientists from Nazi Germany harmed, in a significant way, their students left behind.
11The connection between occupation productivity and individual socializing effort is in
line with Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009) and consistent with observations provided by
Albornoz, Cabrales, Hauk, and Warnes (2017).
12This result is observed by Nix (2015) for the case of Sweden.
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ing, we can provide an explanation for the intensity of spillovers varying across
geographical regions (e.g. Bottazzi and Peri, 2003) and over time (e.g. Jaffe,
1986). We complete our characterization of individual decisions by showing
how the benefits of socializing are greater for highly productive workers; a
feature that rationalizes the existence of fraternities and elite societies (e.g.
Popov and Bernhardt, 2012).
This paper is organized as follows. We begin by discussing our contribution
to the literature (Section 2). In Section 3, we spell out the model. Section 4
contains the equilibrium analysis and the general results valid for any occupa-
tion specific ability distribution. In Section 5, we study the case of a Pareto
distribution of talents. We conclude in Section 6. Most proofs are gathered in
an online Appendix.
2 Contribution to the literature
Our model contributes to several aspects of the literature of occupational
choice. This literature generally builds upon the seminal contribution by Lucas
(1978). In Lucas (1978)’s model as well as in several follow-up papers, ability
has a single dimension which implies the counterfactual prediction that all
entrepreneurs should earn more income than every employee. The literature
has accounted for low and high income in both sectors by adding a second
dimension of ability a` la Roy (1951).13 We follow this approach and allow
for occupation-specific abilities. As a consequence, occupational choices are
determined by comparative rather than absolute advantage. In this context,
Rothschild and Scheuer (2012) and Scheuer (2014) study the optimal design
of redistributive income taxes. We also study optimal policy instruments but
our concern is efficiency not redistribution. A fundamental contribution of our
approach is introducing endogenous spillovers. The few papers studying the
effect of spillovers in occupational choice take them as exogenously given. In
Guiso and Schivardi (2011), exogenous spillovers affect occupational choices
by shifting productivity. In Cicala, Fryer Jr, and Spenkuch (2016); Chandra
and Staiger (2007), exogenous spillovers change relative benefits from differ-
ent activities. We complement this literature by providing a framework where
individual efforts affect the level of spillovers they enjoy and derive its policy
implications.
There is plenty of evidence of excessive or insufficient number of partic-
13Early examples are Heckman and Sedlacek (1985, 1990) and Jovanovic (1994).
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ipants in specific occupations. Many countries make it a priority to spur
entrepreneurship. Shakhnov (2014) finds that financial markets are over-
crowded with respect to entrepreneurship and that the model matches well
US data. Khabibulina and Hefti (2015) find a negative correlation of relative
wages in the financial sector with respect to the manufacturing sector in the
U.S. states from 1977 to 2011. Lopez-Martin (2015) obtain similar results
for the allocation of workers between the formal and informal sectors. Our
paper provides an explanation for these phenomena and shows that overpopu-
lation/underpopulation can emerge in a model without much structure. More
generally, our results have concrete implications for economic growth, as mis-
allocation of talent and resources is viewed as a major force of cross country
GDP and productivity differences (e.g. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1991;
Restuccia and Rogerson, 2013; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).
There is a very large research effort to understand the effect of social
relations and occupational decisions and outcomes (e.g. Granovetter, 1995;
Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Bentolila, Michelacci, and Suarez, 2010,
to mention some of many contributions). The main goal of this literature is
to clarify how previous social connections affect future employment decisions.
In our analysis, occupational choice is driven by future socializing, not past
connections. In this sense, our paper offers a new direction to explore the
relationship between socializing and productive decisions.
3 A model of occupational choice
We consider an economy with a continuum of heterogeneous individuals. Oc-
cupational choice is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, individuals
simultaneously choose their occupation. They can either be employed in oc-
cupation M or in occupation F. For illustrative purposes we will often refer
to occupation F as entrepreneurs and to occupation M as employees, but our
results also apply to different occupation sectors.14 In the second stage, all
agents within the same occupation simultaneously decide their direct produc-
tive effort kni and their socializing effort s
n
i .
14Indeed, when we cite evidence we will make use of the following distinctions: finan-
cial markets versus entrepreneurship, financial markets versus manufacturing, formal versus
informal sector and different academic fields.
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3.1 The pay-offs
Each individual i has an occupation-specific individual productivity parameter
bni for n ∈ {M,F} , which is randomly and independently drawn for each
occupation.15
The payoff within a particular occupation n is the sum of two components,
a private component P ni , and a synergistic component S
n
i derived from social
interactions. The private component P ni has a linear-quadratic cost-benefit
structure and is given by
P ni = d
nbni k
n
i − 1/2 (kni )2 ,
where dn is an occupation-specific parameter and is multiplicative in individual
ability in occupation n.
The synergistic component, Sni , captures that socializing is required to
take advantage of the externalities generated within each occupation, which
are due to the complementarity in productive efforts.16 The synergistic returns
are given by
Sni = ad
nbni (k
n
i )
1/2
∫
j∈Ni
(
dnbnj
(
knj
)1/2
gnij(s
n
i , s
n
j )
)
dj − 1
2
(sni )
2 ,
where Ni denotes the occupational group to which individual i belongs; the
parameter a captures the overall strength of synergies, sn is the profile of all
socializing efforts within the occupation (and which we assume has no effect
between occupations) and gnij(s
n
i , s
n
j ) is the link intensity of individual i and j,
defined as follows:17
gnij(s
n
i , s
n
j ) =
1
Nn
(sni )
1/2 (snj )1/2 . (1)
Each occupational group is composed by a continuum of individuals N n ⊂ R
for n ∈ {M,F} , where the measure of the set N n is Nn.
The payoff of individual i in an occupational group n is the combination
15For the time being we make no specific assumptions on how these abilities are dis-
tributed, which also implies that the distribution of talents across occupations might follow
any correlation structure or be independent. The specific case of a Pareto distribution is
studied in Section 5. Results for the uniform distribution can be found in the working paper
version (Albornoz, Cabrales, and Hauk, 2017).
16Of course, socializing could also have a negative effect, say, because of revealing secrets
to competitors. Assuming complementarity implies that we focus on situations where the
benefits of socializing are larger than the costs.
17We provide a micro-foundation for this functional form in online Appendix A.1.
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of i′s private returns and its synergistic component:
uni = P
n
i + S
n
i
= dnbni k
n
i + ad
nbni (k
n
i )
1/2
∫
j∈Ni
(
dnbnj
(
knj
)1/2
gnij(s
n
i , s
n
j )
)
dj
−1
2
(kni )
2 − 1
2
(sni )
2 . (2)
We interpret the positive part of this individual payoff as the value of
individual output and denote it by yni To be more precise:
yni ≡ dnbni kni + adnbni (kni )1/2
∫
j∈Ni
(
dnbnj
(
knj
)1/2
gnij(s
n
i , s
n
j )
)
dj. (3)
3.2 Discussion of the main assumptions
Our set-up can be thought of describing occupational choice in a competitive
frictionless labor market with endogenous spillovers. There is a bounded set
of workers in the market, namely NM ∪ N F . Their productivity is perfectly
observed. There are no matching frictions. Firms have a linear technology
and there is free entry from an unbounded set of them, and there are no fixed
costs. In this environment, the positive component of individual payoffs yni
corresponds to the value of the output produced by this worker in equilibrium.
In our model, socializing within each occupation is undirected, but it is
directed across occupations.18 This means that within occupational groups
the agents only choose the amount of interaction si, but not the identity of
the individuals with whom they interact. However, individuals choose the
occupational group where they socialize. Many real world examples fit this
way of socializing: entrepreneurs and employees go to conferences or business
fairs, they join professional associations and go to their meetings, or simply
share social activities or events. Synergistic effort is mostly generic within the
conference, fair or social gathering; but clearly individuals carefully choose the
socializing spaces they attend and the associated socializing intensity.
18Undirected socializing and the requirement of socializing to enjoy externalities are fea-
tures shared with Cabrales, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2011). However, we propose a
different functional form for the benefits from synergistic returns. We will show that using
our synergistic component Sni leads to a game with a unique symmetric equilibrium within a
network, while the game in Cabrales, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2011) has multiple equi-
libria. Equilibrium uniqueness in socializing and productive efforts facilitate our analysis of
directed occupational choice.
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We assume that productive efforts are complementary. In particular, we
model synergistic returns as multiplicative in individual productivity parame-
ters and in the square root of productive efforts additively separable by pairs.19
Adopting this specific functional form implies that synergistic returns are sym-
metric in pairwise productive efforts and that the synergistic returns exhibit
constant returns to scale to overall productive efforts.
We restrict individuals to belong to one single group only. This assumption
is consistent with a number of potential applications: most people are either
entrepreneurs or employees. They tend to have only one profession to which
they dedicate themselves; academics generally do not work simultaneously in
very distinct fields; top athletes generally only excel in one sport; and in spite
of “Ingres’ violin” the same thing generally holds for artists.20 It can also
be justified formally within the model in a variety of ways. For example, by
adding a sufficiently large fixed cost to join a group which could arise from
training costs. We also assume no specific capital requirements to become an
entrepreneur. This could be due to the absence of capital market imperfections
or justified by simply assuming that entry costs are similar across occupations.
This way, occupational choices are not associated with initial wealth and we
can focus on social interactions and productive decisions.21
Individual ability in our model is always multiplied by the occupation-
specific parameter dn, so that the “effective” individual ability of individual
i in occupation n is captured by dnbni . This is a purely technical assumption
which amounts to a normalization of the distribution of “effective” abilities
dnbni . It allows us to discuss the comparative statics of a change in the mean
of the ability distribution while fixing the distribution of bni . Obviously a shift
that increases dn involves a specific way to introduce a first order stochastically
dominating shift in “effective” abilities dnbni .
19Complementarity in productive returns in Cabrales, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2011)
is generated by synergistic returns being multiplicative in productive efforts and additively
separable by pairs.
20The term “Ingres’ violin” comes from the French neoclassical artist Jean Auguste Do-
minique Ingres, who while famous for his paintings was also incredibly talented though less
well known for his skill on the violin.
21See Evans and Jovanovic (1989) for the seminal contribution on the analysis of the effect
of liquidity constraints on entrepreneurial choice.
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4 The equilibrium and general results
We solve the game by backward induction. We compare the individual opti-
mum with the social optimum in which a social planner maximizes the sum
of individual utilities. We first solve for the optimal efforts within an occupa-
tional group and then let individuals sort themselves (or be sorted by a social
planner) into occupations.
4.1 Choice of production and socializing efforts
For each individual, we have to find the optimal productive and socializing
effort within each occupation (we suppress the superindex referring to the
occupation when there is no ambiguity). For the individual choice problem -
the decentralized problem - this is the choice of ki and si that maximizes (2).
The social planner, on the other hand, chooses kspi and s
sp
i to maximize the
sum of individual utilities given by
∫
i∈NM∪NF
ui(bi)di =
∫
i∈NM∪NF
(
dNibiki + adNibi
√
kisi
∫
j∈Ni
dNibj
√
kjsj
N i
dj − 1
2
k2i −
1
2
s2i
)
di.
(4)
Denote by b2 =
∫
j∈Ni b
2
jdj. We first define some functions that are going to
be useful in the description of the equilibrium values.
k =
d
1−
(
a
2
d2b2
)2 , s = a2d2b2k, (5)
and
ksp =
d
1−
(
ad2b2
)2 , ssp = ad2b2ksp. (6)
To avoid unbounded equilibrium choices we assume:22
Assumption 1. supNi
(
ad2
∫
j∈Ni b
2
jdj
)2
< 1,
which guarantees that the k and ksp are always well defined. We can now
derive the equilibrium decisions in terms of productive and socializing efforts,
which we state as follows:
Proposition 1. Under assumption 1, both the individual choice problem and
the social planner choice problem have a unique (interior) solution which for
22Note that output is of the order k2 because of the complementarities, like the costs.
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each individual is equal to her own productivity multiplied by a function that
is identical for all individuals in the group.23 That is
ki = bik and si = bis for all i (7)
kspi = bik
spand sspi = bis
sp for all i (8)
for the individual choice problem, and for the social planner, respectively.
Proof. See online Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1 has important empirical consequences. Since individual pro-
ductivity bi is complementary to effort, it follows that
Empirical Implication 1. More talented individuals work harder.
The correlation between talent and effort has been observed in education;
a sector for which we have good data on both ability and effort.24 But these
individual features also translate to the group level, something that allows
to make intergroup comparisons as well. On the one hand, highly talented
individuals generate greater externalities on their fellows. Evidence consistent
with this result is observed in the academic world. For example, the sudden
absence of extremely highly productive researchers provides a natural test
for our prediction. Azoulay, Zivin, and Wang (2010) find that researchers
collaborating with a superstar scientist experience a lasting and significant
decline in their quality adjusted publication rate after the unexpected death of
their superstar collaborator. A result similar in spirit is provided by Waldinger
(2010) when showing that the expulsion of high quality Jewish scientists from
Nazi Germany had a negative effect on the productivity of the Ph.D. students
left behind.
Proposition 1 also shows that average socializing is increasing in average
group productivity b =
∫
j∈Ni bjdj.
25 Therefore,
Empirical Implication 2. Individuals within more productive occupational
groups socialize more on average.
23The individual choice problem also has a trivial partial corner solution, where si = 0.
If nobody socializes, socializing is not profitable. However, this equilibrium is not stable,
since the marginal utility of si is positive for any (even infinitesimally small) average level
of socializing in the occupational group. We therefore ignore this solution in our analysis.
24See e.g. Yeo and Neal (2004) and Babcock and Betts (2009).
25The common group functions are increasing in the average group squared productivity
b2 and in average group productivity b. Since individual socializing is si = bis, average
socializing is bs.
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This empirical implication of our model is consistent with evidence pre-
sented in Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009) showing that the number of
interactions within friendship groups are increasing in their size. Albornoz,
Cabrales, Hauk, and Warnes (2017) provide further empirical evidence for
this prediction based on the analysis of co-authorships within economics fields.
Furthermore, academic life is clearly an example of a situation in which an in-
dividual’s productive outcomes are affected by the abilities and activities of
other researchers involved in the same production process. Hence socializing
decisions become key productive choices. Moreover academics choose their
field of research: their group. Using data scrapped from the IDEAS-RePEc
website Albornoz, Cabrales, Hauk, and Warnes (2017) establish that economic
researchers who work in more productive fields tend to have more co-authors.
Proposition 1 also reveals that average socializing and hence learning spillovers
are increasing in network synergies a. Thus,
Empirical Implication 3. Occupations with fewer synergies should experi-
ence lower interactions and fewer spillovers.
This is indeed found by Nix (2015) for the case of Sweden. After con-
structing a ranking of interactions with peers using Swedish data on work-
ers, their peers, and their firms from 1985-2012, Nix (2015) compares it to
estimated learning spillovers per-occupations and finds a strong correlation
between those two measures.
Insofar as synergies capture institutional and technological aspects of so-
cializing, we can also provide an explanation for the intensity of spillovers
varying across geographical regions (e.g. Bottazzi and Peri, 2003) and over
time (e.g. Jaffe, 1986).
Using the optimal efforts derived in Proposition 1, we can calculate the
associated individual utilities.
Proposition 2. Equilibrium individual utilities are
ui(bi) =
b2i d
2
2

(
1 +
(
a
2
d2b2
)2)
(
1−
(
a
2
d2b2
)2)2
 , (9)
in the individual choice problem and
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uspi (bi) =
1
2
d2b2i(
1−
(
ad2b2
)2) . (10)
for the social planner solution.
Proof. See online Appendix A.2.
From Proposition 2 we observe that while all individuals benefit from being
in a more productive occupational group,26 higher types benefit even more
from a given level of within-occupation externalities.27 Since productivity is
independent of occupational group size for a given average spillover,28 it follows
that
Empirical Implication 4. High types have an incentive to segregate from
low types if possible.
We certainly observe a tendency for high-skilled employees or entrepreneurs
to create elite societies. Good examples are the Freemasons or the Rotary club
(Yanagida (1992), Burt (2003)) where access is restrictive and whose objective
seems to be mainly to socialize among like-minded high-skilled individuals.29
These examples are particularly interesting because they are often secretive,
i.e., they are not created for the purpose of signaling such quality to the
external world.30
From Proposition 1, it is easy to see that individuals fail to internalize
the positive externality of their investment decisions on the other members of
their occupational group. Therefore, the individual utility resulting from the
26Since ∂ui(bi)/∂b2 > 0, and ∂u
sp
i (bi)/∂b
2 > 0, utility increases in b2 for everyone.
27That is, ∂2ui(bi)/∂bi∂b2 > 0, ∂
2uspi (bi)/∂bi∂b
2 > 0, so that individual type and group
type are complementary.
28As shown by Lemma 1 in the online Appendix.
29Carrell, Sacerdote, and West (2013) study interaction in the context of a military
academy. They show that even without physical separation within groups, individuals of
different ability types tend to socialize with one another in homogeneous subgroups.
30There are other examples where elite groups use restricted settings to socialize, like
London clubs in the late 1800s and early 1900s (Brayshay, Cleary, and Selwood (2006),
Brayshay, Cleary, and Selwood (2007)). Also, fraternities in college serve the purpose of
segregation, are mainly for networking and have a positive effect on future income. Mar-
maros and Sacerdote (2002) report that fraternity membership is positively associated with
networking and with finding a high paying job directly out of college. Routon and Walker
(2014) confirm that fraternity membership increases the probability of a recent graduate ob-
taining a job. Mara, Davis, and Schmidt (2016) find that fraternity membership increases
expected future income by roughly 30%.
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decentralized solution (9) is lower than the individual utility resulting from
the social planner solution (10). In other words,
Empirical Implication 5. Individuals underinvest in both productive and
socializing effort (ksp > k and ssp > s).
This underinvestment is specifically severe in professional activities where
learning spillovers are important for productivity31 and provides a rational for
subsidizing these activities. Entrepreneurship has emerged as a key issue in the
policy arena in the last few decades.32 For instance the European Commission
launched the “Small Business Act for Europe” in June 2008, which explic-
itly recognizes the central role of innovative small and medium-size enterprises
(SMEs) in the EU economy and sets out a comprehensive policy framework for
the EU and its member states. In this document, the Commission proposes
that member states should create an environment that rewards entrepreneur-
ship, specifically mentioning taxation in this context. Since entrepreneurial
effort in particular, and effort within an occupation in general, is suboptimal
in the presence of spillovers, we now turn to the determination of an optimal
subsidy within each occupation.
Proposition 3. A subsidy that achieves efficient effort within an occupation
(taking as given the selection into occupations) is given by:
yi − 1
2
d
(ki)
2
ksp
. (11)
Proof. See online Appendix A.3
This subsidy, which is based on observable individual output and produc-
tive effort, alters the original utility in a way that induces socially optimal
levels of effort.33 However, it takes as given the selection into occupations.
For this reason, it is only part of an optimal policy. Individuals choose their
31This is clear in the high-tech industry. To cite one example, Pirolo and Presutti (2007)
analyze the metropolitan high-tech cluster in Rome and show that social interactions are the
most significant determinant of the innovation process and relationships based on knowledge
sharing are the most important ones.
32The Economist on 14th March 2009 published a special report on entrepreneurship with
the title “Global Heroes”.
33Of course, it also assumes that the distribution of talent and other common parameters
are known. But these are things that can in principle be estimated from aggregate data and
observable output.
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occupation, and these individual choices might not be efficient. We now an-
alyze the optimal individual occupational choice and then return to the issue
of taxation to induce efficiency.
4.2 Choice of occupation
Having found the second-stage utilities, we can now solve the first-stage in
which individuals sort themselves into either employees (group M) or en-
trepreneurs (group F ). When deciding which occupational group to join,
individuals take the occupation choices of others as given. They choose the
occupation that grants them the maximal utility given the optimal within oc-
cupation investment choices, which could result from the decentralized or the
centralized solution derived in the previous subsection.
We show that independently of whether productive or socializing efforts
within the occupation are individually chosen (decentralized solution) or by
the social planner, the solution is characterized by a cutoff value C, such that
individuals for whom the ratio bMi /b
F
i < C choose group F , while individuals
for whom for whom bMi /b
F
i > C choose group M .
Such a solution implies that
bM2 = E
(
bM
2
i
∣∣bMi > CbFi ) , (12)
bF 2 = E
(
bF
2
i
∣∣bMi < CbFi ) . (13)
In other words, comparative advantage determines the choice of occupation
in a particularly simple way. Naturally, C is an endogenous function of all the
parameters in the model, and in general, it need not be unique. We denote
the slope of the dividing line by CP if effort choices in the occupational groups
are decentralized and by CE if the social planner implements efficient effort
choices within the occupations.
Proposition 4. For any underlying distribution of abilities, if assumption
1 is satisfied, both CP and CE exist and are decreasing in a
M and dM and
increasing in aF and dF .34
Proof. See online Appendix A.4.
When C decreases more people become employees (join the M -group).
Similarly, an increase in C implies that more people become entrepreneurs (join
34Since we do not establish equilibrium uniqueness, this proposition has to be understood
in a local way, assuming the parameter change does not change equilibrium selection.
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the F -group). Thus, according to Proposition 4, an increase in the power of
synergies, or a specific first order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution
of final abilities, will lead to more people joining the affected occupation.
Higher within-occupation synergies a can be caused by the introduction
of new or improved communication technology facilities. Shifts in d could be
technological changes that affect the productivity of every individual in a given
occupation. Or they could be due to institutional features.
The effect of communication technologies (changes in a) on productivities
has been widely acknowledged.35 To our knowledge, there is no study link-
ing the relative sizes of economic sectors with their differential adoption of
communication technologies. This paper provides a clear prediction for this
linkage.
Empirical Implication 6. The differential adoption of communication tech-
nologies in different sectors should be accompanied by an increase in the relative
size of the sector after the technology is adopted.
This prediction can be tested in future research and exhibits the nice feature
of being independent of the underlying distribution of abilities. Similarly,
our model delivers clear and testable predictions for a shift in d. This is
especially relevant if we interpret our model as choosing to work in the formal
or informal sector. In some institutional settings very large (or very small)
firms are extremely regulated, while in others there are too many loopholes
for politically connected firms. A looser control of informal activities induces
a high d in the informal sector. The d in the formal sector would suffer from
high taxation. Therefore,
Empirical Implication 7. More people will work in the informal sector at
the expense of working in the formal sector the looser the controls of informal
activities and the higher formal sector taxation.
Lopez-Martin (2015) finds plentiful evidence consistent with this implica-
tion.
35Some examples are: Lio and Liu (2006) who find positive and significant relationship
between the adoption of information and communication technology and agricultural pro-
ductivity based on data collected in 81 countries for the period 1995–2000. Bayes (2001)
find that village phones in Bangladesh allow farmers to obtain better prices through infor-
mation diffusion. Genius, Koundouri, Nauges, and Tzouvelekas (2013) provides this type
of evidence for olive farmers in Greece while Sene (2015) studies peanut farmers in Senegal
and obtains a positive impact of connectivity on output.
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The above results only indicate how the relative occupational sector sizes
change with the underlying parameters, but they do not inform us about the
efficiency or inefficiency of the equilibrium outcomes. However, independently
of the direction of inefficiency, we can show that every relative sector size
can be achieved using a linear tax/subsidy no matter the underlying talent
distributions and hence the planner can also achieve the social optimal sorting
into occupations. Furthermore:
Proposition 5. The first-best allocation for the social planner, including the
socially optimal C, can be achieved in equilibrium using a linear tax/subsidy
on output t, plus a subsidy equal to t
(
yi − 12d (ki)
2
ksp
)
.
Proof. See online Appendix A.5.
Proposition 5 establishes that a first-best allocation can be achieved by
combining a linear tax with a particular subsidy for any type of distribution of
talents. However, since there might be multiple equilibria in the occupational
choice stage, it abstracts from equilibrium selection issues. Also, in order to
determine the correct linear tax or subsidy, which depends on whether an
unregulated occupational sector is too big or too small, we will need to make
specific assumptions about the underlying talent distributions. In what follows
we will focus on the Pareto distribution which is empirically relevant and - as
we will show - leads to a unique equilibrium in our model.36
5 The case of a Pareto distribution of talent
The empirical relevance of the Pareto distribution for describing variations
of wages and income across individuals has been well established.37 Since its
shape parameter is an inverse measure of the spread of talent, the Pareto distri-
bution therefore also captures the empirical distribution of talents. Assuming
that individual talents in each occupation follow a Pareto distribution and
that talent is occupation-specific leads to a unique equilibrium in our model.38
Proposition 6. If abilities are distributed independently and follow a Pareto
law in [1,∞) with shape parameter αj for j ∈ {M,F}, both CP , defined by
(28) and CE, defined by (30) exist and are unique.
36The working paper version also includes results for the uniform distribution (Albornoz,
Cabrales, and Hauk, 2017).
37For example, Mandelbrot (1960); Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2015).
38Notice that we assume uncorrelated talents for expositional simplicity. As discussed
below, our main results in this section are robust to the correlation structure.
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Proof. See online Appendix A.6.
Consequently, there is also a unique first best solution, which requires an
intervention at both margins, i.e. by inducing optimal effort within the occu-
pation as well as choices leading to the optimal occupational choice. Without
an intervention on location, one sector will be overpopulated while the other
sector will be underpopulated. There is plenty of evidence of excessive or in-
sufficient size of specific occupations. Shakhnov (2014) shows that financial
markets are too large with respect to the entrepreneurship sector with a model
that matches well US data. Khabibulina and Hefti (2015) find a negative cor-
relation of relative wages in the financial sector with respect to manufacturing
sector in case of the U.S. states from 1977 to 2011. A similar, while somewhat
less robust, result applies to the case of relative sector sizes as measured by the
labor force. Our paper provides an explanation for these phenomena and shows
that productive and informational spillovers are prime candidate mechanisms
for overpopulation/underpopulation to emerge in economic sectors.
The following results provide some insights on the direction of overpopula-
tion when abilities follow a Pareto distribution and investments in productive
and socializing effort are optimally determined by a social planner.39
Proposition 7. Let abilities be independently distributed, and assume they
follow a Pareto law in [1,∞) for n ∈ {M,F} with a common shape parameter
α. Without loss of generality assume that sector F has higher overall strength
of synergies, i.e.aFdF > aMdM . Then social welfare may increase by adding
(i.e. ∂w(C)
∂C
∣∣∣
C=CE
> 0) or by decreasing (i.e. ∂w(C)
∂C
∣∣∣
C=CE
< 0) the number of
workers in occupation F .
In particular,
• The sector with the overall higher strength of synergies (the F-sector) is
underpopulated for distributions with relatively low dispersion.40
39Proposition 7 established that intervening only locally within a group leads to subopti-
mal choice of occupations. This poses the question whether an uncoordinated intervention
can be worse than no intervention. In the working paper version (Albornoz, Cabrales, and
Hauk, 2017), we provide an example of such a result when the talent distribution is uniform
and in the presence of a special type of congestion costs. In this setup the equilibrium is
also unique.
40The exact technical condition is the following: For fixed values of aF , aM , dF and dM ,
satisfying aM
2
dM
2
< aF
2
dF
2
, there is a value of α high enough such that ∂w(C)∂C
∣∣∣
C=CE
> 0).
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• When overall synergies are sufficiently small in both occupations, the
F-sector is overpopulated for sufficiently low synergies aF .41
Proof. See online Appendix A.7.
If the overall strength of synergies is higher in the F -sector, then reallo-
cating M -types that are close to indifferent to occupation F leads to lower
welfare in occupation F , since the average type in occupation F decreases. At
the same time, welfare in occupation M increases because the average type
in occupation M increases.42 The overall effect on social welfare is therefore
ambiguous. Notice that Proposition 7 establishes that occupation F is under-
populated for distributions with relatively low dispersion (high values of α).
Notice as well that a low dispersion in a Pareto distribution implies that the
number of superstars is very small.43 Thus, if both sectors have a low number
of very able individuals, the welfare can increase by augmenting the size of the
sector, which has the larger impact of synergies.
Empirical Implication 8. If the number of very able individuals in each
sector is small, the sector with the larger impact of synergies will be too small.
Proposition 7 also establishes a second rule of thumb:
Empirical Implication 9. The size of the occupation with higher overall
synergies is sub-optimally large when synergies are sufficiently small in both
occupations.44
To the extent that dispersion of talents and the strength of spillovers within
a particular occupation are observable, Empirical Implications 8 and 9 provide
potentially useful rules of thumb to detect local underpopulation or overpop-
ulation of different occupational sectors. Verifying these rules is left as an
empirical challenge for future work.
41The exact condition is the following: for fixed values of dF , dM and for(
aM
2
dM
2
)(
aF
2
dF
2
)
< 1, there is an aF low enough such that the F-sector is overpop-
ulated ( ∂w(C)∂C
∣∣∣
C=CE
< 0).
42This is true because the average type in occupation F decreases with C, while the
average type in occupation M increases with C.
43Because high α implies low dispersion so the tails of the distribution are thin.
44To see this, notice that occupation F is overpopulated when aF is very low. Since F
has higher overall synergies (aM
2
dM
2
< aF
2
dF
2
) this also implies a sufficiently low aM
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Inequality and effort choices
The Pareto distribution is also appropriate to study the link between inequality
of abilities and productive and socializing efforts. Since - as we explained
already - the shape parameter αi is an (inverse) measure of the spread of talent,
we can simply associate a general increase of inequality with a reduction of
αi. One difficulty with the Pareto, though, is that reducing αi increases both
mean and dispersion. To circumvent this problem, we look at the effect of a
“neutralized” reduction in αj that keeps the unconditional mean of the Pareto
distribution constant.45 This way, we focus exclusively on the effect of changes
in the dispersion of talent, which we associate with inequality.
Proposition 8. Suppose abilities are distributed independently and follow a
Pareto law in [1,∞) with shape parameter αj for j ∈ {M,F}. Suppose as
well that the shape parameter αj of one of occupations decreases and that a
is reduced to exactly compensate for the increase in the unconditional mean of
squared types.46 Then, if we hold CE or CP constant, both bM
2 and bF 2 in-
crease, and thus productive and socializing effort increase in both occupations.
Proof. See Appendix A.8.
Proposition 8 simply states that if the dispersion of talents in one occupa-
tion increases, both occupations receive a better selection of types and hence
productive and socializing effort increase in both occupations. The basic intu-
ition is that the tails of one of the distribution is now larger and comparative
advantage forces a selection mostly from the tails.47
Clearly, the effect of inequality in talent on socializing and productive
efforts emerges from the existence of spillovers within occupations. This is a
45More specifically, as αj falls we impose an equivalent change is a to reduce effort as much
as necessary to fix the unconditional mean of the Pareto distribution; which is E
(
bj
2
i
)
=
αj/ (αj − 2) , for j ∈ {M,F}).
46i.e. a′ = a (αj − 2)αj .
47For a more analytical explanation, note that the expression for bF 2 can be written as:
bF 2 =
∫ ∞
1
bF
2
fF
(
bF
) FM (CbF )∫∞
1
fF (bF )FM (CbF ) dbF
dbF .
Observe that if αM decreases, the amount of mass on the tail of the distribution increases.
In this way, the weight given to larger values of bF increased by a (now larger) factor
FM
(
CbF
) ∫∞
1
fF
(
bF
)
FM
(
CbF
)
dbF .
The effect of a decrease of αF is more direct, as it increases fF
(
bF
)
for larger values of
bF . But of course, we are compensating for the direct increase by reducing a. But the key
difference in the conditional expectation is that the F
(
CbF
) ∫∞
1
f
(
bF
)
F
(
CbF
)
dbF term,
now unchanged, gives more weight to changes that occur for higher values of bF .
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novel empirical implication of our model that stands as a challenge for future
empirical work.
Empirical Implication 10. An increase in inequality in talent leads to higher
production and more socialization in all occupations.
Admittedly, assuming that productivity parameters are independent across
occupations requires some degree of heroism. A natural question is whether
our results hinge on this assumption. We find it reassuring that our proposi-
tions 6 and 8 for the Pareto distribution are robust to the following correlation
structure: with probability p the two values of bji for j ∈ {F,M} are indepen-
dent of one another. With probability (1− p), they coincide, namely bMi = bFi
and they are distributed with shape parameter αF . Indeed, both propositions
6, and 8 are proved under this assumption which includes the independence
assumption for p = 1.48
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study a model that integrates productive and socializing ef-
forts with occupational choice. Socializing allows for capturing informational
spillovers between individuals. We show that the existence of spillovers leads
to some interesting implications. It causes more talented individuals to work
harder, generating bigger positive externalities within their occupation, but
they also have incentives to segregate. We also show that average socializing
increases in average group productivity and in network synergies. Also, any
increase in within occupation synergies or improvement in final abilities for
an occupation causes more people to choose this occupation no matter how
abilities in the different occupations are distributed. This result provides inter-
esting testable implications on how sector sizes should vary, for example, after
the introduction of new communication technologies, which may be adopted
differentially across sectors. Another interesting implication of endogenous
spillovers is that a higher inequality of abilities in one occupation imply more
socialization and productive efforts in both occupations. This is something
that would not happen in a world without spillovers within occupations.
Our framework can be applied to investigate a range of different contexts,
where individuals choose which group to belong to and then decide how much
48We have not been able to show whether Proposition 7 is also robust to correlation, but
we have not found a counterexample either.
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to invest in the productive and socializing efforts. Education choices share
many features with the case we studied in this paper. We intend to use this
model in future work to study the demand and supply for different subjects and
skills (e.g. high-level Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math). Interest-
ingly, the case of education choices requires endogenizing ability. In Albornoz,
Cabrales, and Hauk (2017), we take a first step in this direction, where parents
can initially invest in their children’s abilities. We show that parental educa-
tional investment can mitigate or reinforce distributional inefficiencies. Our
model could also be useful to study residential choice, as the benefits of living
in a community often depend on social interactions within them. The choices
of leisure activities are another potential fruitful avenue of application of our
ideas. A more intriguing area for the development of this kind of model refers
to aspects more connected to an individual’s identity. The national, religious,
or ethnic identification of a person is sometimes a matter of choice, and is
connected to the decisions of others. For example, whether a person feels she
is European, British or Welsh, and to which degree, could be influenced by
her efforts and those of others in pursuit of their own identity. We think that
our contribution is an important step towards understanding the determinants
and effects of socializing.
One possible avenue for further research would be to explore the dynamic
implications of our model. The agents’ choices in our framework are static,
but the work on homophily shows that some fruitful insights can be obtained
from dynamic models of group formation. For example, Bramoulle´, Currarini,
Jackson, Pin, and Rogers (2012) show that it is only for young individuals
that homophily-based contact search biases the type distribution of contacts.49
Hence in the long-term groups need not be type-biased. We could extend
our model to allow for participation in more than one occupation over time
and thus ascertain if biases in occupational choice persist over time. Clearly,
another extension would be to allow some spillovers between groups and partial
participation of agents in several of them. We could also allow for horizontal
preferences over occupations which are not necessarily related to individual
productivity and for correlated productivities across occupations.
49Another example of the interaction of homophily and dynamics is Golub and Jackson
(2012), which shows that homophily induces a lower speed of social learning (the opinions
of others like me are likely to be similar to my own).
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A Online appendices
A.1 A microfoundation for the gnij function
Lemma 1. Suppose that, for all s 6= 0, the link intensity satisfies the following
assumptions50:
(A1) Symmetry: gnij(s
n
i , s
n
j ) = g
n
ji(s
n
j , s
n
i ), for all i, j, n;
(A2) The total interaction intensity of individual i in group n exhibits constant
returns to scale to overall inputs in socializing efforts and symmetry:∫
j∈Ni g
n
ij(s
n
i , s
n
j )dj =
1
Nn
∫
j∈Ni (s
n
i )
1/2 (snj )1/2 dj;
(A3) Anonymous socializing: gnij(s
n
i , s
n
j )/
(
snj
)1/2
= gnki(s
n
k , s
n
i )/ (s
n
k)
1/2, for all
i, j, k;
Lemma 2. Then, the link intensity is given by
gnij(s
n
i , s
n
j ) =
1
Nn
(sni )
1/2 (snj )1/2 .
Proof of Lemma 1: Fix s. Combining (A1) and (A3) gives
(snk)
1/2 gnij(s
n
i , s
n
j ) =
(
snj
)1/2
gnij(s
n
i , s
n
k).
Integrating across all j’s and using (A2) gives gnij(s
n
i , s
n
k) =
1
Nn
(sni )
1/2 (snk)
1/2.
Notice that given (A2) and a level of socializing effort for all members of
the group, total socializing of an individual in a group
∫
j∈Ni g
n
ij(s
n
i , s
n
j )dj is
independent of the size of the group. In other words, individuals will not have
more contacts in larger occupational groups if everyone in the same occupation
chooses the same sni independent of size. One could easily accommodate other
assumptions, where socializing is either easier or more difficult in larger groups
by using 1/ (Nn)β for some β different from 1.
A.2 Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
The FOC for the decentralized problem are
50While Cabrales, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2011) also model symmetric and anony-
mous socializing, which is the key for generic socializing, they assume that link intensity
satisfies aggregate constant returns to scale.
1
ki = dbi +
a
2
d2bi
√
si
ki
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj for all i (14)
si =
a
2
d2bi
√
ki
si
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj for all i (15)
while the FOC for the social planner simplify to
kspi = dbi + ad
2bi
√
sspi
kspi
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kspj s
sp
j
N i
dj for all i (16)
sspi = ad
2bi
√
kspi
sspi
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kspj s
sp
j
N i
dj for all i (17)
We first prove that ki
si
=
kj
sj
for all i and j.
We divide (14) by (15) to get
ki
si
=
d+ a
2
d2
√
si
ki
K (b,k, sp)
a
2
d2
√
ki
si
K (b,k, sp)
=
√
ki
si
+ a
2
dK (b,k, s)
a
2
dki
si
K (b,k, sp)
(18)
where bold face letters denote vectors and
K (b,k, sp) =
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj
Rearranging (18) gives
d
(
ki
si
)2
a
2
K (b,k, sp) =
√
ki
si
+ d
a
2
K (b,k, sp) (19)
from which it is immediate that
ki
si
= F (K (b,k, sp))
for some K (.) with a unique solution. To see the uniqueness notice that letting√
ki
si
= xi (19) can be written as
dx4i
a
2
K (b,k, sp) = xi + d
a
2
K (b,k, sp) (20)
2
the left hand side of (20) is a convex function taking the value 0 when xi = 0
and the right hand side it is a linear and takes the positive value da
2
K (b,k, sp)
when xi = 0. Hence there is a single crossing point at the positive orthant.
Hence
ki = dbi +
a
2
d2bi
K (b,k, sp)√
F (K (b,k, sp))
for all i
si =
a
2
d2bi
√
F (K (b,k, sp))K (b,k, sp) for all i
Thus it is clear we can write
ki = bik (b,k, sp) for all i
si = bis (b,k, sp) for all i
An analogous proof establishes that also for the centralized problem
kspi = bik
sp (b,ksp, spsp) for all i
sspi = bis
spKsp (b,ksp, spsp) for all i
It remains to determine the common optimal group parameters.
Using ki = bik and si = bis it follows that K (b,k, sp) =
∫
j∈Ni
b2j
√
ks
N i
dj =
b2
√
ks for the individual problem where
b2 =
∫
j∈Ni
b2j
N i
dj
and using kspi = bik
sp and sspi = bis
sp it follows that Ksp (b,ksp, spsp) =
b2
√
kspssp for the centralized problem.
Suppressing the dependence on the vectors, we get two simultaneous equa-
tions with two unknowns, namely
k = d+ d2
a
2
√
sp
k
b2
√
ks = d+ d2
a
2
b2s
s =
a
2
d2
√
k
sp
b2
√
ks =
a
2
d2b2k
3
k =
d
1−
(
a
2
d2b2
)2
s =
a
2
d3b2
1−
(
a
2
d2b2
)
for the decentralized problem and
ksp = d+ ad2
√
ssp
ksp
b2
√
kspssp = d+ ad2b2ssp (21)
ssp = ad2
√
ksp
ssp
b2
√
kspssp = ad2b2ksp (22)
ksp =
d
1−
(
ad2b2
)2
ssp =
ad3b2
1−
(
ad2b2
)
for the centralized problem.
The optimal investments follow immediately from solving this system of
linear equations. Assuming
(
ad2b2
)2
< 1 guarantees positive investment lev-
els.
Introducing the optimal investment levels into the utility functions gives
us
k =
d
1−
(
a
2
d2b2
)2
s =
a
2
d3b2
1−
(
a
2
d2b2
)
4
ui(bi) = db
2
i k + ad
2b2i ksb
2 − 1
2
b2i k
2 − 1
2
b2i s
2
= db2i
d
1−
(
a
2
d2b2
)2 + ad2b2i d
1−
(
a
2
d2b2
)2 a2d3b2
1−
(
a
2
d2b2
)b2
−1
2
b2i
 d
1−
(
a
2
d2b2
)2

2
− 1
2
b2i
 a2d3b2
1−
(
a
2
d2b2
)
2
=
b2i d
2
2

(
1 +
(
a
2
d2b2
)2)
(
1−
(
a
2
d2b2
)2)2

for the decentralized solution and
uspi (bi) = db
2
i k
sp + ad2b2i k
spsspb2 − b
2
i
2
(ksp)2 − b
2
i
2
(ssp)2
=
1
2
d2b2i(
1−
(
ad2b2
)2) .
for the centralized solution.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Let the subsidy be
yi − 1
2
d
(ki)
2
ksp
then the resulting utility with this subsidy is
uni = d
nbni k
n
i + ad
nbni (k
n
i )
1/2
∫
j∈Ni
(
dnbnj
(
knj
)1/2
gnij(s
n
i , s
n
j )
)
dj − 1
2
(kni )
2 − 1
2
(sni )
2 .
+dnbni k
n
i + ad
nbni (k
n
i )
1/2
∫
j∈Ni
(
dnbnj
(
knj
)1/2
gnij(s
n
i , s
n
j )
)
dj − 1
2
d
k2i
ksp
This leads to first order conditions
ki = 2dbi + ad
2bi
√
si
ki
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj − d ki
ksp
for all i (23)
si = ad
2bi
√
ki
si
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj for all i (24)
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letting ki = bik
sp and si = bis
sp, we get
ksp = d+ ad2
√
ssp
ksp
b2
√
kspssp = d+ ad2b2ssp (25)
ssp = ad2
√
ksp
ssp
b2
√
kspssp = ad2b2ksp (26)
Clearly the system (25) , (26) is the same as (21) , (22) and thus (23) , (24) also
solves the same system as (16),(17) and the result follows.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
We first establish existence and a useful technical result for the rest of the
proposition.
Lemma 3. For any underlying distribution of abilities, if assumption 1 is sat-
isfied, there exist mappings f(C) and g(C) such that a zero of the mappings
f(C) and g(C) is an equilibrium of, respectively, the decentralized and cen-
tralized problems. Furthermore an equilibrium always exists, and in any stable
equilibrium, ∂f(C)
∂C
< 0 and ∂g(C)
∂C
< 0.
Proof. Under the decentralized solution, individuals choose to become an em-
ployee (group M) if and only if ui(b
M
i ) ≥ ui(bFi ). Hence, whenever
bM
2
i d
M2
2

(
1 +
(
aM
2
dM
2
bM2
2
)2)
(
1−
(
aM
2
dM2bM2
2
)2)2
 > bF
2
i d
F 2
2

(
1 +
(
aF
2
dF
2
bF 2
2
)2)
(
1−
(
aF
2
dF 2bF 2
2
)2)2
 .
(27)
If the dividing line exists, its slope is defined when the expressions on either
side of the inequality in (27) are equal. In other words, the dividing line is
defined by the following expression:
bMi = b
F
i
dF
dM
√√√√√√√√
(
1 +
(
aF
2
dF 2bF 2
2
)2)
(
1−
(
aF
2
dF 2bF 2
2
)2)2
(
1−
(
aM
2
dM2bM2
2
)2)2
(
1 +
(
aM
2
dM2bM2
2
)2) = bFi CP .
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Hence CP is the fixed point of the mapping
CP =
dF
dM
√√√√√√√√
(
1 +
(
aF
2
dF 2bF 2
2
)2)
(
1−
(
aF
2
dF 2bF 2
2
)2)2
(
1−
(
aM
2
dM2bM2
2
)2)2
(
1 +
(
aM
2
dM2bM2
2
)2) , (28)
where the right hand of (28) depends on CP through bM
2 and bF 2 , which
are defined by equations (12) and (13) respectively. Put differently, CP is
implicitly defined by a zero of the mapping
g(C, ·) ≡ d
F 2
dM2
(
1 +
(
aF
2
dF
2
bF 2
)2)
(
1−
(
aF
2
dF 2bF 2
)2)2
(
1−
(
aM
2
dM
2
bM2
)2)2
(
1 +
(
aM
2
dM2bM2
)2) − C2. (29)
If ssp and ksp are induced by the social planner (say via subsidies), people
would choose to become an employee (group M) if and only if uspi (b
M
i ) ≥
uspi (b
F
i ) and the dividing line, should it exist, would solve
CE =
dF
dM
√√√√√√√
(
1−
(
adM2bM2
)2)
(
1−
(
adF 2bF 2
)2) , (30)
and is implicitly defined by a zero of the mapping
f(C, ·) ≡ d
F 2
dM2
1−
(
aMdM
2
bM2
)2
1−
(
aFdF 2bF 2
)2 − C2. (31)
Define
gA(C) ≡ d
F 2
dM2
(
1 +
(
aF
2
dF
2
bF 2
)2)
(
1−
(
aF
2
dF 2bF 2
)2)2
(
1−
(
aM
2
dM
2
bM2
)2)2
(
1 +
(
aM
2
dM2bM2
)2)
so that g (C, ·) = gA(C)−C2. Then, given that we assume that supC
(
ad2b2
)2
<
7
1g(0, ·) > 0
Then, note that the assumption supC
(
ad2b2
)2
< 1 means that b2 is bounded
above, so the numerator of the function gA (C) is bounded above by
(
1 +
(
aF
2
dF
2
supC b
F 2
)2)
.
Similarly the denominator of gA (C), is bounded below by
(
1−maxC
(
aF
2
dF
2
bF 2
)2)2
.
This means that for all C
gA (C) <
dF
2
dM2
(
1 +
(
aF
2
dF
2
supC b
F 2
)2)
(
1−maxC
(
aF
2
dF 2bF 2
)2)2
which implies that if we define Cg as
Cg ≡
√√√√√√√ dF 2dM2
(
1 +
(
aF
2
dF 2 supC b
F 2
)2)
(
1−maxC
(
aF
2
dF 2bF 2
)2)
we have that for all C > Cg
g (C, ·) < 0
and thus by the mean value theorem there exists a value C∗ ∈ (0, Cg) such
that g (C∗, ·) = 0.
Similarly, let
fA(C) ≡ d
F 2
dM2
1−
(
aMdM
2
bM2
)2
1−
(
aFdF 2bF 2
)2
so that f (C, ·) = fA(C)−C2. Then, given that we assume that supC
(
ad2b2
)2
<
1
f(0, ·) > 0
The assumption supC
(
ad2b2
)2
< 1 means that b2 is bounded above, so the nu-
merator of the function fA (C) is bounded above by
(
1−
(
aMdM
2
supC b
M2
)2)
.
Similarly the denominator of fA (C), is bounded below by
(
1−maxC
(
aFdF
2
bF 2
)2)2
.
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This means that for all C
fA (C) <
dF
2
dM2
(
1 +
(
aMdM
2
supC b
M2
)2)
(
1−maxC
(
aFdF 2bF 2
)2)
which implies that if we define Cf as
Cf ≡
√√√√√√√ dF 2dM2
(
1 +
(
aMdM2 supC b
M2
)2)
(
1−maxC
(
aFdF 2bF 2
)2)
we have that for all C > Cf
f (C, ·) < 0
and thus by the mean value theorem there exists a value C∗ ∈ (0, Cf) such
that f (C∗, ·) = 0.
For stability, note that if g (C) > 0 we would have
dM
2
2

(
1 +
(
aM
2
dM
2
bM2
2
)2)
(
1−
(
aM
2
dM2bM2
2
)2)2
 < dF
2
2

(
1 +
(
aF
2
dF
2
bF 2
2
)2)
(
1−
(
aF
2
dF 2bF 2
2
)2)2

and thus for an individual with bMi = Cb
F
i would not be indifferent between
group M and F but would prefer to move to group F so that C would present
a tendency to increase. This leads us to postulate a natural tatoˆnnement-like
adjustment dynamic
∂C (t)
∂t
= R (g (C (t, ·)))
where R (.) is an increasing function that is positive if and only if g (C, ·) is
positive. It is then easy to see that in any stable equilibrium C∗∗, g (C, ·) has
to be decreasing at C∗∗ as otherwise, a small increase or decrease from C∗∗
will push the dynamics away from the equilibrium. An analogous argument
proves the result for f (C, ·) .
By Lemma 3, ∂f(C)/∂C < 0 and ∂g(C)/∂C < 0, hence to establish com-
9
parative static results, one only needs to check the sign of the derivatives of
the functions defining CP and CE with respect to the underlying parameters
an and dn for n ∈ {M,F}. So using the implicit function theorem, we only
need to check how the functions f (.) and g (.) vary directly with aM , aF , dM
and dF to calculate how C changes with those underlying parameters.
We start by looking at changes in aM
∂f(C, ·)
∂aM
=
dF
2
dM2
−2aM
(
dM
2
bM2
)2
1−
(
aFdF 2bF 2
)2 < 0
g(C, ·) = d
F 2
dM2
(
4 +
(
aFdF
2
bF 2
)2)
(
4−
(
aFdF 2bF 2
)2)2
(
4−
(
aMdM
2
bM2
)2)2
(
4 +
(
aMdM2bM2
)2) − C2P = 0
sign
(
∂g(C, ·)
∂aM
)
= sign

−4aM
(
dM
2
bM2
)2(
4−
(
aMdM
2
bM2
)2)(
4+
(
aMdM
2
bM2
)2)
(
4+
(
aMdM2bM2
)2)2
−
2aM
(
dM
2
bM
2
)2(
4−
(
aMdM
2
bM
2
)2)2
(
4+
(
aMdM2bM2
)2)2

< 0
Hence
dCE
daM
= −
∂f(C,·)
∂aM
∂f(C,·)
∂CE
< 0
dCP
daM
= −
∂g(C,·)
∂aM
∂g(C,·)
∂CP
< 0
If the synergies of the M -group become more important, C decreases, thus
more people join the M -group. We now show that the opposite happens when
synergies in the F -group increase.
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∂f(C, ·)
∂aF
=
dF
2
dM2
(
1−
(
aMdM
2
bM2
)2)
2aF
(
dF
2
bF 2
)2
(
1−
(
aFdF 2bF 2
)2)2 > 0
sign
(
∂g(C, ·)
∂aF
)
= sign

2aF
(
dF
2
bF2
)2(
4−
(
aF dF
2
bF2
)2)2
((
4−
(
aF dF2bF2
)2)2)2
+
4aF
(
dF
2
bF2
)2(
4−
(
aF dF
2
bF2
)2)(
4+
(
aF dF
2
bF2
)2)
((
4−
(
aF dF2bF2
)2)2)2

> 0
Hence
dCE
daF
= −
∂f(C,·)
∂aF
∂f(C,·)
∂CE
> 0
dCP
daF
= −
∂g(C,·)
∂aF
∂g(C,·)
∂CE
> 0
Now we look at changes in dM .
f(C, ·) = d
F 2
dM2
1−
(
aMdM
2
bM2
)2
1−
(
aFdF 2bF 2
)2 − C2E = 0 (32)
∂f(C, ·)
∂dM
= −2d
F 2
dM3
1−
(
aMdM
2
bM2
)2
1−
(
aFdF 2bF 2
)2 − dF 2dM2 4d
M3
(
aMbM2
)2
1−
(
aFdF 2bF 2
)2 < 0
Hence
∂CE
∂dM
= −
∂f(C,·)
∂dM
∂f(C,·)
∂CE
< 0
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Similarly
sign
(
∂g(C, ·)
∂dM
)
= sign

−4dM3
(
aM bM2
)2(
4−
(
aMdM
2
bM2
)2)(
4+
(
aMdM
2
bM2
)2)
(
4+
(
aMdM2bM2
)2)2
−
4dM
3
(
aM bM2
)2(
4−
(
aMdM
2
bM2
)2)2
(
4+
(
aMdM2bM2
)2)2

< 0
Therefore
∂CP
∂dM
= −
∂g(C,·)
∂dM
∂g(C,·)
∂CE
< 0
If dM increases fewer people join the F−group.
Finally we want to understand how the dividing line is affected by changes
in dF .
∂f(C, ·)
∂dF
=
1−
(
aMdM
2
bM2
)2
dM2


2dF
(
1−
(
aFdF
2
bF 2
)2)
+ 2aF
(
dF
2
bF 2
)2
dF
2
(
1−
(
aFdF 2bF 2
)2)2
 > 0
Therefore
∂CE
∂dF
= −
∂g(C,·)
∂dF
∂g(C,·)
∂CE
> 0
Similarly
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sign
(
∂g(C, ·)
∂dF
)
=
dF
2
(
4 +
(
aFdF
2
bF 2
)2)
(
4−
(
aFdF 2bF 2
)2)2
= sign

(
8dF+6dF
5
(
aF bF2
)2)(
4−
(
aF dF
2
bF2
)2)2
((
4−
(
aF dF2bF2
)2)2)2
+
8dF
3
(
aF bF2
)2(
4−
(
aF dF
2
bF2
)2)(
4dF
2
+dF
2
(
aF dF
2
bF2
)2)
((
4−
(
aF dF2bF2
)2)2)2

> 0
Therefore
∂CP
∂dF
= −
∂g(C,·)
∂dF
∂g(C,·)
∂CE
> 0
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
We first establish
Lemma 4. Any C ∈ [0,∞) can be obtained in equilibrium using a linear
tax/subsidy on output.
Proof. We characterize the optimal choices under a linear tax/subsidy on out-
put. The FOC for the decentralized problem are
ki = dtbi +
a
2
d2tbi
√
si
ki
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj for all i (33)
si =
a
2
d2tbi
√
ki
si
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj for all i (34)
We first prove that ki
si
=
kj
sj
for all i and j.
We divide (33) by (34) to get
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ki
si
=
d+ a
2
d2
√
si
ki
K (b,k, sp)
a
2
d2
√
ki
si
K (b,k, sp)
=
√
ki
si
+ a
2
dK (b,k, s)
a
2
dki
si
K (b,k, sp)
(35)
where bold face letters denote vectors and
K (b,k, sp) =
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj
Rearranging (35) gives
d
(
ki
si
)2
a
2
K (b,k, sp) =
√
ki
si
+ d
a
2
K (b,k, sp) (36)
from which it is immediate that
ki
si
= F (K (b,k, sp))
for some K (.) with a unique solution. To see the uniqueness notice that letting√
ki
si
= xi (36) can be written as
dx4i
a
2
K (b,k, sp) = xi + d
a
2
K (b,k, sp) (37)
the left hand side of (37) is a convex function taking the value 0 when xi = 0
and the right hand side it is a linear and takes the positive value da
2
K (b,k, sp)
when xi = 0. Hence there is a single crossing point at the positive orthant.
Hence
ki = dtbi +
a
2
d2tbi
K (b,k, sp)√
F (K (b,k, sp))
for all i
si =
a
2
d2tbi
√
F (K (b,k, sp))K (b,k, sp) for all i
Thus it is clear we can write
ki = bik (b,k, s,t) for all i
si = bis (b,k, s,t) for all i
We now determine the common optimal group parameters.
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Using ki = bik and si = bis it follows that K (b,k, sp) =
∫
j∈Ni
b2j
√
ks
N i
dj =
b2
√
ks for the individual problem where
b2 =
∫
j∈Ni
b2j
N i
dj
Suppressing the dependence on the vectors, we get two simultaneous equa-
tions with two unknowns, namely
k = dt+ d2t
a
2
√
sp
k
b2
√
ks = dt+
a
2
d2tb2s
s =
a
2
d2t
√
k
sp
b2
√
ks =
a
2
d2tb2k
which lead to
k =
dt
1−
(
a
2
d2tb2
)2
s =
a
2
d3t2b2
1−
(
a
2
d2tb2
)2
Assuming
(
ad2tb2
)2
< 1 guarantees positive investment levels.
Introducing the optimal investment levels into the utility functions gives
us
ui(bi) = db
2
i tk + ad
2b2i tksb
2 − 1
2
b2i k
2 − 1
2
b2i s
2
= b2i
(
dtk + ad2tksb2 − 1
2
k2 − 1
2
s2
)
=
b2i d
2t2
2

2
(
1−
(
a
2
d2tb2
)2)
+ 4
(
a
2
d2tb2
)2
− 1−
(
a
2
d2tb2
)2
(
1−
(
a
2
d2tb2
)2)2

so that
ui(bi) =
b2i d
2t2
2
 1 +
(
a
2
d2tb2
)2
(
1−
(
a
2
d2tb2
)2)2
 (38)
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for the decentralized solution.
Similarly for the centralized solution the first order conditions are
ki = dtbi + ad
2tbi
√
si
ki
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj for all i (39)
si = ad
2tbi
√
ki
si
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj for all i (40)
and using analogous arguments as before we have that using ki = bik
sp and
si = bis
sp the expressions (39) and (40) can be written as
k = dt+ d2ta
√
sp
k
b2
√
ks = dt+ ad2tb2s
s = ad2t
√
k
sp
b2
√
ks = ad2tb2k
where
k =
dt
1−
(
ad2tb2
)2
s =
ad3t2b2
1−
(
ad2tb2
)2
This leads, after some manipulations, as before, to
ui(bi) =
b2i d
2t2
2
1(
1−
(
ad2tb2
)2)2 (41)
From expression (38) we get that the equation that defines CP implicitly
is
g(C, t, ·) = d
F 2tF
2
dM2tM2
(
4 +
(
aFdF
2
tF bF 2
)2)
(
4−
(
aFdF 2tF bF 2
)2)2
(
4−
(
aMdM
2
tMbM2
)2)2
(
4 +
(
aMdM2tMbM2
)2) −C2P = 0
(42)
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and from expression (41) we get that the equation that defines CP implicitly
is
f(C, t, ·) = d
F 2tF
2
dM2tM2
1−
(
aMdM
2
tMbM2
)2
1−
(
aFdF 2tF bF 2
)2 − C2E = 0 (43)
From expression (43) and (42) we get that lim tF
tM
→0CE = lim tF
tM
→0CP = 0
and lim tM
tF
→0CE = lim tM
tF
→0CP = ∞. This, plus continuity of CE and CP as
a function of tF , tM establishes that one can obtain any value of CE and CP
between 0 and ∞ by appropriately varying tF
tM
.
Having established Lemma 4 we now proceed with the remainder of the
proof of Proposition 5
Given the tax and subsidy scheme proposed we can write the utility of the
agent as
uni = t
n
(
dnbni k
n
i + ad
nbni (k
n
i )
1/2
∫
j∈Ni
(
dnbnj
(
knj
)1/2
gnij(s
n
i , s
n
j )
)
dj
)
− 1
2
(kni )
2 − 1
2
(sni )
2
+tn
(
yi − 1
2
d
(ki)
2
k
)
= 2tn
(
dnbni k
n
i + ad
nbni (k
n
i )
1/2
∫
j∈Ni
(
dnbnj
(
knj
)1/2
gnij(s
n
i , s
n
j )
)
dj
)
− 1
2
(kni )
2 − 1
2
(sni )
2
−tn
(
1
2
d
(ki)
2
k
)
The FOC for the decentralized problem for all i are:
ki = dt
nbi +
a
2
d2tnbi
√
si
ki
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj + tn
(
dbi +
a
2
d2bi
√
si
ki
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj − dki
k
)
si =
a
2
d2tnbi
√
ki
si
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj + tn
(
a
2
d2bi
√
si
ki
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj
)
.
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Letting ki = bik
sp and si = bis
sp, we have
ki = dt
nbi + ad
2tnbi
√
si
ki
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj for all i (44)
si = ad
2tnbi
√
ki
si
∫
j∈Ni
bj
√
kjsj
N i
dj for all i (45)
Notice that the expressions (44) and (45) are identical to (39) and (40)
Hence we will have that
ksp =
dtn
1−
(
a
2
d2tnb2
)2
ssp =
a
2
d3tn2b2
1−
(
a
2
d2tnb2
)2
and
ui(bi) =
b2i d
2t2
2
1(
1−
(
ad2tb2
)2)2 (46)
The remainder of the proof follows from Lemma 4.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
We assume now that returns b follow a Pareto distribution with shape pa-
rameter αi for i ∈ {F,M}
f (b) =
αi
bαi+1
for 1 ≤ b ≤ ∞
We will prove a slightly more general statement of the proposition, allowing
for the following correlation structure. With probability p the two values of
bji for j ∈ {F,M} are independent of one another. With probability (1− p),
bMi = b
F
i and they are distributed with shape parameter αF .
We will derive the results under the assumption that the C that defines
the dividing line bMi = Cb
F
i is such that C ≥ 1.51 Existence follows from
51If C < 1, the same results hold with the names of the networks interchanged.
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Proposition 3.
We now calculate bF 2 and bM2 for C ≥ 1. Note that in the correlated part,
bMi = b
F
i implies that b
M
i < Cb
F
i and thus if one player gets a correlated draw
she forms part of the F network).
bF 2 = E
(
bF
2
i
∣∣bMi < CbFi ) = p
∫∞
1
∫ CbF
1
bF
2 αF
bF
αF+1
αM
bM
αM+1
dbMdbF∫∞
1
∫ CbF
1
αF
bF
αF+1
αM
bM
αM+1
dbMdbF
+ (1− p)
∫ ∞
1
bF
2 αF
bF
αF+1
dbF
= p
αF
αF − 2
((αF + αM − 2)CαM − (αF − 2))(
CαM − αF
αF+αM
)
(αF + αM − 2)
+ (1− p)
∫ ∞
1
αF
bF
αF−1 db
F
= p
αF
αF − 2
((αF + αM − 2)CαM − (αF − 2))(
CαM − αF
αF+αM
)
(αF + αM − 2)
+ (1− p) αF
αF − 2
which can be rewritten as
bF 2 = p (αF + αM)
αF
(αF − 2)
(αF + αM − 2)CαM − (αF − 2)
((αF + αM)CαM − αF ) (αF + αM − 2)+(1− p)
αF
αF − 2
(47)
while
bM2 = E
(
bM
2
i
∣∣bMi > CbFi )
= p
αMαF
(αM−2)CαM−2
1
(αF+αM−2)
αF
CαM
1
αF+αM
which simplifies to
bM2 = p
αM
(αM − 2)
αF + αM
(αF + αM − 2)C
2 (48)
bM2 is obviously increasing in C. We now show that bF 2 is decreasing in C
∂bF 2 (C)
∂C
= − (αF + αM)
(αF + αM − 2)
αF
(αF − 2)
(
2α2MC
αM−1
((αF + αM)CαM − αF )2
)
< 0 (49)
We first prove uniqueness of CE defined by
CE =
dF
dM
√√√√1− aMdMbM22
1− aFdF bF 22
(50)
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Note that the LHS of (50) is increasing in CE so all we need to show is the RHS
is decreasing in CE so that a unique equilibrium exists. Clearly the numerator
of the RHS is decreasing in CE because bM
2 is increasing in CE. Since bF
2 is
decreasing in CE, the denominator of the RHS is increasing in CE. And thus
the result follows.
We now prove uniqueness of CP which is defined by
CP =
√√√√√√√√ dF
2
dM2
(
1 +
(
aF
2
dF 2bF 2
)2)
(
1−
(
aF
2
dF 2bF 2
)2)2
(
1−
(
aM
2
dM2bM2
)2)2
(
1 +
(
aM
2
dM2bM2
)2) (51)
Again note that the LHS of (51) is increasing in CP so all we need to show is the
RHS is decreasing in CP so that a unique equilibrium exists. It is again easy
to see that
(
1−
(
aM
2
dM
2
bM2
)2)2
/
(
1 +
(
aM
2
dM
2
bM2
)2)
is decreasing in CP
because bM2 is increasing in CP . Also, since we showed in (49) that bF
2 is de-
creasing in CP then
(
1 +
(
aF
2
dF
2
bF 2
)2)
/
(
1−
(
aF
2
dF
2
bF 2
)2)2
is decreasing
CP . As a result RHS of (51) is decreasing in CP and the result follows.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
We will prove the proposition for αF = αM .. We will first show that
Lemma 5. CE > 1⇔ aM2dM2 < aF 2dF 2
Note also that if aM
2
dM
2
= aF
2
dF
2
the solution of (50) is at CE = 1. An
increase of aM
2
dM
2
with respect to aF
2
dF
2
displaces the RHS to the left so
that the new equilibrium entails CE < 1.
We will now show that for CE > 1 there might be too few
∂w(C)
∂C
∣∣∣
C=CE
> 0
or too many people ∂w(C)
∂C
∣∣∣
C=CE
< 0 in the F group compared to the social
optimum.52 The F group will be underpopulated if and only if
aM
2
dM
2
aF 2dF 2
>
((2α− 2)Cα − (α− 2))2Cα
α2 (2Cα − 1)3C2 (52)
52The assumption CE > 1 is without loss of generality subject to relabeling. It implies
that synergies are bigger in occupation F .
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We will check how a decentralized group choice deviates from the efficient
group choice Csp implemented by a social planner who maximizes social wel-
fare. We study the case where the social planner also implements the socially
optimal investments in productive and socializing effort.
The social planner would choose C to maximize social welfare with socially
optimal investments in productive and socializing efforts where social welfare
is given by
w(C) =
∫ ∞
1
∫ CbF
1
bF
2
i
2
(
1
1− aF 2dF 2bF 22
)
α
bF
α+1
i
α
bM
α+1
i
dbMi db
F
i
+
∫ ∞
1
∫ ∞
CbF
bM
2
i
2
(
1
1− aM2dM2bM22
)
α
bF
α+1
i
α
bM
α+1
i
dbMi db
F
i
∂w(C)
∂C
=
[∫ ∞
1
bF
3
i
2
((
1
1− aF 2dF 2bF 22
)
− C2
(
1
1− aM2dM2bM22
))
α
bF
α+1
i
α
(CbFi )
α+1db
F
i
]
+
∫ ∞
1
∫ CbF
1
∂
(
bF
2
i
2
(
1
1−aF2dF2bF2
2
))
∂C
α
bF
α+1
i
α
bM
α+1
i
dbMi db
F
i
+
∫ ∞
1
∫ ∞
CbF
∂
(
bM
2
i
2
(
1
1−aM2dM2bM2
2
))
∂C
α
bF
α+1
i
α
bM
α+1
i
dbMi db
F
i
Now at CE =
√
1−aM2dM2bM2
2
1−aF2dF2bF2
2
∂w(C)
∂C
∣∣∣∣
C=CE
= aF
2
2bF 2
α
α− 2
1
α− 1
(
−2αCα−1
(2Cα − 1)2
)(
1
1− aF 2dF 2bF 22
)2
α ((2α− 2)Cα − (α− 2))
(2α− 2) (α− 2)Cα
+aM
2
2bM2
α
α− 2
α
α− 12C
(
1
1− aM2dM2bM22
)2
α2
α− 2
1
Cα−2
1
(2α− 2)
CE =
√
1−aM2dM2bM2
2
1−aF2dF2bF2
2 → C4
(
1
1−aM2dM2bM2
2
)2
=
(
1
1−aF2dF2bF2
2
)2
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Therefore
∂w(C)
∂C
∣∣∣∣
C=CE
> 0⇐⇒ −aF 2dF 2 ((2α− 2)C
α − (α− 2))2
(2Cα − 1)3C + a
M2dM
2 α2
Cα−1
> 0
⇐⇒ a
M2dM
2
aF 2dF 2
>
((2α− 2)Cα − (α− 2))2Cα
α2 (2Cα − 1)3C2
and
∂w(C)
∂C
∣∣∣∣
C=CE
< 0⇐⇒ a
M2dM
2
aF 2dF 2
<
((2α− 2)Cα − (α− 2))2Cα
α2 (2Cα − 1)3C2
By Lemma 5 since CE > 1⇔ aM2dM2 < aF 2dF 2 , hence aM
2
dM
2
aF2dF2
< 1.
We will now show that
1 >
((2α− 2)Cα − (α− 2))2Cα
α2 (2Cα − 1)3C2 =
((α− 1) (2Cα − 1) + 1)2Cα
α2 (2Cα − 1)3C2 (53)
Note that
((α− 1) (2Cα − 1) + 1)2 < α2 (2Cα − 1)2
since that expression is equivalent to
(α− 1) (2Cα − 1) + 1 < α (2Cα − 1)
⇔ 1 < 2Cα − 1⇐⇒ 1 < Cα
thus
((α− 1) (2Cα − 1) + 1)2Cα
α2 (2Cα − 1)3C2 <
Cα
(2Cα − 1)C2 <
1
C
< 1 (54)
where the last two inequalities hold since C > 1, noting that in that case
2Cα − 1 > Cα. Thus equation (54) establishes (53).
The next two lemmas establish that overpopulation can occur in both sec-
tors and depends on the underlying parameters. Lemma 6 shows the existence
of parameter values that ∂w(C)
∂C
∣∣∣
C=CE
< 0 while Lemma 7 shows the existence
of parameter values that ∂w(C)
∂C
∣∣∣
C=CE
> 0.
Lemma 6. Let a
M2dM
2
aF2dF2
= r < 1. For a fixed α and r there exists an aF
2
low
enough that
r =
aM
2
dM
2
aF 2dF 2
<
((2α− 2)Cα − (α− 2))2Cα
α2 (2Cα − 1)3C2 .
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Since
CE =
√√√√√ 1− raF 2dF 2 ( αα−2 αα−1C2E)2
1− aF 2dF 2
(
α
α−2
1
α−1
(
(α− 1) + 1
2CαE−1
))2
we have that
lim
aF2dF
2→0
CE
(
α, r, aF
2
, dF
2
)
= 1
thus
lim
aF2dF2→0
((2α− 2)Cα − (α− 2))2Cα
α2 (2Cα − 1)3C2 = limaF2dF2→0
((2α− 2)− (α− 2))2
α2
= 1 > r.
Lemma 7. Let a
M2dM
2
aF2dF
2 = r < 1. For a fixed aF
2
and r such that CE exists,
there is an α high enough that
r =
aM
2
dM
2
aF 2dF 2
>
((2α− 2)CαE − (α− 2))2CαE
α2 (2CαE − 1)3C2E
For a bounded CE
C ≡ lim
α→∞
C2E = lim
aF2→0
1− raF 2dF 2C4E
1− aF 2dF 2
Hence
raF
2
dF
2
C4 +
(
1− aF 2dF 2
)
C2 − 1 = 0
and thus
C2 =
−
(
1− aF 2dF 2
)
±
√
(1− aF 2dF 2)2 + 4raF 2dF 2
2raF 2dF 2
Now since
lim
α→∞
((2α− 2)CαE − (α− 2))2CαE
α2 (2CαE − 1)3C2E
= lim
α→∞
(2Cα − 1)2 α2Cα
α2 (2Cα − 1)3C2 =
1
2C2
In other words, we would like to show that for α high enough
C2 >
1
2r
23
or
−
(
1− aF 2dF 2
)
+
√
(1− aF 2dF 2)2 + 4raF 2dF 2
2raF 2
>
1
2r
(55)
√
(1− aF 2dF 2)2 + 4raF 2dF 2 > 1
aF
2
dF
2
(
aF
2
dF
2
+ 4r − 2
)
> 0
which requires r > 2−a
F2dF
2
4
which is true for example if r > 1
2
.
Proposition 7 immediately follows from these Lemmas.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 8
We will prove this Proposition for a slightly more general case, using the same
correlation structure as in the proof of Proposition. 6. With probability p
the two values of bji for j ∈ {F,M} are independent of one another. With
probability (1− p), bMi = bFi and they are distributed with shape parameter
αF . With this correlation structure bF
2 and bM2 have been calculated by (47)
and (48) respectively, as
bF 2 = p (αF + αM)
αF
(αF − 2)
(αF + αM − 2)CαM − (αF − 2)
((αF + αM)CαM − αF ) (αF + αM − 2)+(1− p)
αF
αF − 2
bM2 = p
αM
(αM − 2)
αF + αM
(αF + αM − 2)C
2
We now normalize bM2 by the expected second moment αM
(αM−2) . Hence
bM2NORM = p
αF + αM
(αF + αM − 2)C
2 = p
(
1 +
2
αF + αM − 2
)
C2
Clearly, this is decreasing in αF and αM .
We normalize bF 2by the expected second moment αF
(αF−2) .Hence
bF 2NORM = p (αF + αM)
(αF + αM − 2)CαM − (αF − 2)
((αF + αM)CαM − αF ) (αF + αM − 2) + (1− p)
= p
CαM − (αF−2)
(αF+αM−2)
CαM − αF
(αF+αM )
+ (1− p)
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Noting that
∂bF 2NORM
∂αF
= p
1
CαM − αF
αF+αM
( −1
αF + αM − 2 +
αF − 2
(αF + αM − 2)2
)
−p 1(
CαM − αF
αF+αM
)2 ( −1αF + αM + αF(αF + αM)2
)
×
(
CαM − αF − 2
αF + αM − 2
)
= p
1
CαM − αF
αF+αM
( −αM
(αF + αM − 2)2
)
− p C
αM − αF−2
αF+αM−2(
CαM − αF
αF+αM
)2 ( −αM(αF + αM)2
)
= p
αM
CαM − αF
αF+αM
( −1
(αF + αM − 2)2
)
+
CαM − αF−2
αF+αM−2(
CαM − αF
αF+αM
) ( 1
(αF + αM)
2
)
we want to show that
∂bF 2NORM
∂αF
< 0.
A sufficient condition is( −1
(αF + αM − 2)2
)
+
CαM − αF−2
αF+αM−2(
CαM − αF
αF+αM
) ( 1
(αF + αM)
2
)
< 0
CαM − αF−2
αF+αM−2(
CαM − αF
αF+αM
) < (αF + αM)2
(αF + αM − 2)2
or(
CαM − αF − 2
αF + αM − 2
)
(αF + αM − 2)2 <
(
CαM − αF
αF + αM
)
(αF + αM)
2
(56)
We will now show that
G (αF ) ≡ (αF + αM)2
(
CαM − αF
αF + αM
)
is increasing in αF and given that ∂bF
2
NORM/∂αF < 0 is equivalent to expres-
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sion (56) the result follows. Then
∂G (αF )
∂αF
= −
(
1
αF + αM
− αF
(αF + αM)
2
)
(αF + αM)
2
+
(
CαM − αF
αF + αM
)
(2αF + 2αM)
=
( −αM
(αF + αM)
2
)
(αF + αM)
2 + 2 (CαM (αF + αM)− αF )
= 2 (CαM (αF + αM)− αF )− αM > 0
Now note that
bF 2NORM = p
CαM − αF−2
αF+αM−2
CαM − αF
αF+αM
+ (1− p)
Now
∂bF 2NORM
∂αM
= −p
(
CαM − αF−2
αF+αM−2
)
(
CαM − αF
αF+αM
)2 ( αF(αF + αM)2 + CαM lnC
)
+p
1
CαM − αF
αF+αM
(
αF − 2
(αF + αM − 2)2
+ CαM lnC
)
then
∂bF 2NORM
∂αM
< 0
requires
1
CαM − αF
αF+αM
(
αF − 2
(αF + αM − 2)2
+ CαM lnC
)
<
(
CαM − αF−2
αF+αM−2
)
(
CαM − αF
αF+αM
)2 ( αF(αF + αM)2 + CαM lnC
)
which is equivalent to
1(
CαM − αF−2
αF+αM−2
) ( αF − 2
(αF + αM − 2)2
+ CαM lnC
)
<
1(
CαM − αF
αF+αM
) ( αF
(αF + αM)
2 + C
αM lnC
)
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Clearly this is true as αF/ (αF + αM)
2 , αF/ (αF + αM) and 1/
(
CαM − αF
αF+αM
)
all increase in αF .
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